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Wood v. Lucy: The Overlap Between
Interpretation and Gap-Filling to Achieve
Minimum Decencies*
Nicholas R. Weiskopf+
Wood v. Lucy is a wonderful teaching tool because it uses a
combination of interpretive and gap-filling techniques to create
a contractual duty as to which the parties had been silent-the
terms of Wood's exclusive said nothing about any affirmative
obligation on his part to market, or attempt to market, the fa-
mous Lady Duff-Gordon's creations. Instead of concluding that
Wood had been left to act in his own self-interest, Cardozo spins
an intricate web to come up with an obligation of good faith ef-
forts. His avowed purpose is to avoid placing one party at the
"mercy" of the other.
Given the precedential respect Wood has enjoyed for almost
a century,' one ought be surprised at how many newer deci-
sions, especially New York law decisions, flatly refuse to treat
good faith as any sort of independent duty-as a source of
"new" obligations not specified by the agreement as interpreted.
We will see that an Official Comment to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code appears to be in accord with these cases. Under this
restrictive approach, good faith precepts shape the performance
of actual undertakings, but no more. Silence in the face of the
foreseeable bespeaks a shared intent not to regulate or restrict.
For instance, according to the Eleventh Circuit applying Florida
* Copyright © 2007 Nicholas R. Weiskopf.
+ Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. J.D., Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law, 1969; A.B. Columbia College, 1966.
1. Uniform Commercial Code section 2-306(2) provides that a goods transac-
tion based on exclusive dealing "imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by
the buyer to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts
to promote their sale." U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (1993). This rule has been applied by
direct analogy to exclusive distributorship cases, and the New York Annotations to
section 2-306(2) provide that it "is apparently based upon Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917)." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-306 (McKinney 2007).
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law,2 there can be no good faith restriction on a franchisor's
opening of a fast food operation which substantially competes
with those of an existing long-time franchisee unless there is an
actual term of agreement on that subject in the franchise con-
tract. Most would find such a conclusion problematic.
While I leave the specifics of other such decisions for later
discussion, it is interesting to speculate as to what promotes
them. What leads to a conclusion that an implied good faith
obligation cannot be used to create obligations beyond those ac-
tually specified in the contract? It would appear that many
courts are confusing principles of interpretation, including parol
evidence restrictions, with "minimum decencies" to be read into
contracts as a matter of law. This leads to the view that absent
a bargain in fact derived from words of agreement or implied in
fact from party conduct, there is no hook for any sort of good
faith requirement to attach itself. Under such an approach,
there can be no tandem use of interpretation and gap-filling in
the setting of terms.
New York's Appellate Division, by unanimous vote of five to
zero, adopted this restrictive approach in Wood,3 as did three
dissenters on the Court of Appeals. In rejecting any idea that
Wood's exclusive impliedly obligated him to use reasonable af-
firmative efforts on Lucy's behalf, the intermediate appellate
court considered the terms of actual agreement, but then simply
stopped. If interpretation failed to yield a legally enforceable
promise by each party, there was no contract:
The enforcement of his promise to collect and pay over is thus
made to depend upon an act which he has not agreed to perform
and which the defendant cannot compel him to perform .... It is
quite apparent that in this respect the defendant gives everything
and the plaintiff gives nothing and there is a lack of mutuality in
the contract.4
It fell to Cardozo to take the next step:
2. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
that there was no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing "where the party alleged to have breached the implied covenant has in
good faith performed all of the express contractual provisions").
3. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 164 N.Y.S. 576 (App. Div. 1917).
4. Id. at 577.
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The implication of a promise here finds support in many circum-
stances. The defendant gave an exclusive privilege. She was to
have no right for at least a year to place her own indorsements or
market her own designs except through the agency of the plain-
tiff. The acceptance of the exclusive agency was an assumption of
its duties .... We are not to suppose that one party was to be
placed at the mercy of the other .... Many other terms of the
agreement point the same way.5
To further enforce the meshing of factual and legal implication
(a combination of actual and presumed intent) Cardozo ex-
plained that "[w]ithout an implied promise, the transaction can-
not have such business efficacy as both parties must have
intended that at all events it should have."6
The processes of interpretation and gap-filling can, if one
wishes, be portrayed in the abstract as distinct; unless interpre-
tation cannot provide an answer, there is no need to gap-fill be-
cause there is no omitted case to resolve by implication as a
matter of law.7 Yet, while "[t]he supplying of an omitted term is
not technically interpretation . the two are closely related."8
As a leading text explains:
[Tihe borderline between terms implied-in-fact (i.e., agreed to in
some meaningful sense by the parties themselves) and implied-in-
law (imposed by the court) is not an easy one to draw. Certainly
one of the reasons militating in favor of an implied-in-law term
may be its apparent consistency with the intention of the parties
9
5. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (citations
omitted).
6. Id.
7. The comments to section 204 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
which provides for the supplying of "omitted essential terms," portray gap-filling of
omitted terms as a post-interpretive step. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 204 (1981). Comment C states that "[i]nterpretation may be necessary to deter-
mine that the parties have not agreed with respect to a particular term, but the
supplying of an omitted term is not within the definition of interpretation." Id. at
cmt. c. See also ALAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 604 (Foundation Press
2001) (there is a "gap" if the contract, "when interpreted, does not cover the case at
hand" ).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. a (1981).
9. CHARLES KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 431-32 (5th ed. 2003).
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Despite the fact that gap-fillers may be supported by pre-
sumed party intent, they are also supplied to further commu-
nity standards of fairness and policy. Says a leading treatise:
There are those who preach the sometimes discordant gospels of
economic efficiency, the implementation of communitarian values,
the inference of norms implicit in the parties' relationship, or im-
plicitly consented to .... It cannot be said that the legal system
has adopted any of these criteria as exclusive. 10
The implied covenant of good faith may be seen as the pa-
triarch of all gap-fillers. According to one study, the phrase "im-
plied covenant of good faith" is found in more than 10,000 cases
decided between 1985 and 1994.11 A quarter century ago, Pro-
fessor Summers referenced this covenant "as a kind of 'safety
valve' to which judges may turn to fill gaps and qualify or limit
rights and duties otherwise arising under ... specific contract
language."12 Despite efforts to bring structure and predictabil-
ity to the concept and its application, it is simply too talismanic
to be susceptible to precise definition. 13 Unlike other implied at
law terms, good faith is not a default concept used to fill only
one particular sort of omitted case. 14 Instead, good faith
precepts are typically infused into contractual arrangements in
an effort to preserve "minimum decencies." Subspecies of the
good faith principle include implied obligations of reasonable (or
10. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 55 (5th ed.
2003).
11. Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith In Contract Inter-
pretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling A Revered Relic,, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 559,
561 (2006).
12. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 812 (1982).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning
varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement
of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and con-
sistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a vari-
ety of types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. The
appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with
the circumstances.
Id.
14. By a "particular sort of omitted case," I refer, for instance, to one of impos-
sibility or impracticability of performance where the omitted term sought to be
supplied is an implied at law condition excusing performance.
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best) efforts, those of cooperation and those of non-prevention of
performance or satisfaction of a condition.
It is true that a good faith requirement is often engrafted
onto an express covenant to prevent opportunism. Purchase
guarantees under a requirements contract must be set in keep-
ing with commercial good faith.15 Similarly, a promise to re-
ceive evidence as part of a review process entails the obligation
to consider it.16 There are also, however, classic fact patterns
involving possible prevention in which good faith does not at-
tach to any particular express undertaking by the party to be
restrained. Even if a construction contract is silent on the sub-
ject, a refusal by "Owner" to permit "Contractor" reasonable ac-
cess to the work site will be treated as a breach by prevention.
To take it a step further, Judge Posner has held that breach of
an implied good faith covenant can sometimes rest on an oppor-
tunistic failure to warn a counterparty that it is overlooking a
critical part of an existing contract to its material detriment. 7
Of course, in some situations, there is a blurry distinction
between use of good faith precepts to "round out" an express
covenant and such use to create a new obligation. This is gener-
ally less so when a court is asked to deal with the unforeseen. 8
The distinction can take on the most clarity, however, when the
issue is whether to supply a good faith obligation as a matter of
law to regulate contractual interaction between those of une-
qual power, either by virtue of their position in the market-
place, or because of the facial structuring of their ostensible
agreement. It is here that implications of good faith require-
ments may have little to do with already existing actual terms
of understanding. There are obviously cases in which "big
brother" is actually seeking to preserve the very sharp edge the
express words of agreement seem clearly to provide, and the
15. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2003).
16. Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 653 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1995).
17. Market Street Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
18. A famous case of this type is Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,
188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933). Good faith and fair dealing required plaintiff, who was
to share in receipts from a play and hence had to approve other uses of the work
"except movie rights," to nonetheless have approval and revenue entitlement with
respect to a talking motion picture based on the play. Id. This conclusion was
because the parties could not contemplate the advent of "talkies" when they made
their deal, and this new development would otherwise detract from revenues from
the play itself. Id.
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weaker counterparty may have every reason so to understand.
In such cases, the supplying of good faith restrictions becomes a
sub rosa sort of equitable reformation.
Authorities Limiting Good Faith Restrictions To Performance
of Actual Undertakings
In 1994, the Uniform Commercial Code Permanent Edito-
rial Board created an Official Comment to what was then sec-
tion 1-203's provision that "[elvery contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement. "19 That Comment, to what is now section 1-304,
provides:
This section does not support an independent cause of action for
failure to perform or enforce in good faith. Rather, this section
means that a failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a specific
duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes a breach of that
contract or makes unavailable, under the particular circum-
stances, a remedial right or power. This distinction makes it clear
that the doctrine of good faith merely directs a court towards in-
terpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they
are created, performed, and enforced, and does not create a sepa-
rate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be indepen-
dently breached. 20
While the Comment is indeed curious, the Code at least tem-
pers truncation of the good faith concept by taking a very ex-
pansive view of the concept of "Agreement," defining it in
section 1-201(3) to include "the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circum-
stances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance." 21 If the reference to "implication" is designed to
go beyond the traditional interpretive feeds which are speci-
fied-if "implication" refers to the reading in of mercantile
"minimum decencies" as a matter of law-then perhaps there is
little harm done. Still, this needs clarification. Worse still is
that certain case decisions go even further in the wrong direc-
tion. These case decisions limit the use of good faith to the
shaping of only those duties explicitly set forth.
19. U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (1994) (current version at U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003)).
20. U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. n.1 (2003).
21. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2003).
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Here are some examples of cases refusing to use good faith
except to round out explicit duties. Each is based on New York
law. A federal court, asked to hold securities brokers in breach
for allegedly bad faith misconduct, stated that the duty of good
faith "cannot be used to create independent obligations beyond
those agreed upon... in the express language of the contract."22
A research scientist who cannot show discrimination has no
claim for bad faith termination because the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealings cannot create any sort of restric-
tions not enumerated in the parties' actual agreement. 23 A
lender is not required by implied good faith obligation to negoti-
ate a loan extension because "the implied covenant ... does not
create any new contractual rights."24 Nor does the alleged bad
faith call of a loan state a claim because there is no such cause
of action absent violation of express contractual restrictions. 25
The roll call continues. In one case, when a terminated dis-
tributor sued the manufacturer for improperly taking its cus-
tomers, the court dismissed the claim for legal insufficiency
because the contract was silent on the subject.26 The same ap-
proach was taken in another case with respect to allegations of
bad faith under an acquisition agreement. 27
22. Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275, 306
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
23. Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat'l Labs, 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 584 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) ("[T]he duty does not create new contractual rights that are not enumerated
in the express contract .... Nor does the implied covenant provide an 'independent
basis of recovery."').
24. Geler v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
25. Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nationale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("Under New York law, parties to an express contract are bound by an
implied duty of good faith, 'but breach of that duty is merely a breach of the under-
lying contract."').
26. Ari & Co. v. Regent Int'l Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 518, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
("Finally, the breach of the covenant of good faith claim must be dismissed because
it seeks to recover for obligations that were not explicitly part of the Agreement.
New York law is clear that the implied covenant cannot be used to create indepen-
dent obligations beyond the contract.").
27. Wolff v. Rare Medium, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
("[T]he obligation of good faith does not create obligations that go beyond those
intended and stated in the language of the contract.").
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A Critique
It may well be that the results in all or most of the cases I
have just referenced are correct on the merits, but their reason-
ing is suspect. With the enactment of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and the preparation and adoption of Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, it is said that contract law has
evolved from set rules of across-the-board application to stan-
dards which address the potentially unique realities of transac-
tional context.28 Hence, the implied covenant of good faith
especially protects the so-called "dependent party" from the ex-
ercise of bad faith discretion by the other. A prolific author on
this topic, Professor Burton, went so far as to suggest that good
faith restrictions are a true policing mechanism most directly
activated when the stronger party actually intends to recapture
the freedom of action he has relinquished to induce the
bargain.29
While there has been criticism of the Burton approach,30
there is certainly a moralistic flavor to implications of good faith
requirements. Perhaps that justifies a focus on the subjective
intent of the party accused of bad faith. 31 Cardozo may have
been ahead of his time in this regard. Where the transactional
context was that of "all eggs in one basket" dependency, the
holder of the exclusive could not deliberately leave the other in
the lurch given her perceived contrary expectations. We are left
with an amalgam of the objective and the subjective, and with a
joining of the manifested and the presumed. Interpretation and
gap-filling are not sequenced but melded. The exhaustion of all
interpretive steps is not needed to create a "gap" designed to
28. See generally Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and
Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1982).
29. Stephen J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per-
form in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 378-94 (1980). According to this work,
the subjective intent of one alleged to have acted in bad faith is of "central impor-
tance." Id at 384 n.7.
30. Summers, supra note 12, at 830-34.
31. E.g., Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983) (using the
"honesty in fact" test to define certain good faith obligations of a publisher). See
Market Street Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (Where
Judge Posner, after rejecting altruism as a good faith standard, states that "[ilt is
another thing to say that you can take deliberate advantage of an oversight by
your contract partner."). See also U.C.C. § 2-103 (2005) (defining good faith to in-
clude "honesty in fact").
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leave room for mandated observance of perceived minimum de-
cencies in the course of performance.
It may also be that cases limiting good faith restrictions to
the performance of actual undertakings are making the unsafe
assumption that omission of reference to foreseeable issues be-
speaks the shared intent to let the chips fall where they may.32
"Gaps" also arise, however, where both parties, or at least the
weaker one, choose not to place a potential "deal breaker" on the
table. This may well be what happened in the franchise case
discussed early on in this piece.
Cases Using Gap Filling to Create Causes of Action Based on
Judicially Created Terms
Obviously, there are many New York law cases fitting this
description. Under the implied at law duties of cooperation and
non-prevention, courts, for a long time, have seen fit to create
obligations (and prohibitions) rather than merely to shape those
which are already there. At times, there will be reference to
some ill-defined custom and usage, but at times not. The fact
that a publishing contract says nothing about releasing a com-
peting work on the same subject does not mean there is no
breach of the implied duty of good faith if it does So. 33 One who
offers to pay a commission if his counterparty can purchase a
parcel below a certain price cannot overbid that party at auction
to deprive him of any payment. 34 One who is to pay commission
"on closing" still owes that payment if she breaches the contract
of sale. Implicit in the grant of an exclusive concession is the
licensee's obligation to attempt to secure the requisite per-
mits. 35 Implicit in a grant of conversion rights to bondholders is
the obligation to provide notice of intended redemption so that
32. See, e.g., Translantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (for a traditional approach in cases of claimed "cost impracticability"). See
generally U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. 1 (2003) (noting that there can be impracticability
"because of unforeseen supervening circumstances").
33. Van Valkenberg v. Hayden Pub. Co., 330 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1971).
34. Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 97 N.E. 472 (N.Y. 1912) (this decision predates
Wood).
35. Swartz v. War Mem'l Comm'n of Rochester, 267 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div.
1966).
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conversion rights may be exercised. 36 Surely, in such cases, as
in Wood, the courts are not dealing with the unforeseen or the
remote. Said one court by way of explanation in a case finding a
breach despite the absence of a specific covenant dealing with
the issue at hand:
Under New York law, there exists in every contract an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant is violated
when a party to a contract acts in a manner that, although not
expressly forbidden by any contractual provision, would deprive
the other of the right to receive the benefits under their
agreement.
[I]t seems doubtful that the covenant of good faith-even as in-
formed by industry customs-permits a promoter, who has con-
tracted to advance the fortunes of two fighters who compete in the
same class, both of whom the promoter has under exclusive con-
tract, actively to further one fight outcome over another in a title
bout the promoter has arranged between them .... To hold it
acceptable for such a promoter to lead a fighter to the ring, only to
then act partially to influence the fight outcome against the same
fighter's interest, does not appear to comport with the notion of
fair dealing that inheres in every contract.37
As one might expect, there are decisions which have had to
confront directly an assertion that good faith cannot create
"new" duties to coexist with those in the contract. These cases
hold that an independent claim/cause of action does in fact exist
for breach of the implied duty of good faith even when no actual
breach of express terms is, or can be, set forth.
In Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Keystone Distributors,
Inc.,38 a court was faced with a bank's assertion that it had un-
lawfully been deprived of revenues under a contract arrange-
ment with several mutual funds. The court granted summary
judgment dismissing a claim for breach of contract, but refused
to dismiss a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing because "[a] party may be in breach of the
36. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying New York law).
37. Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741, 767-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(citations omitted).
38. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Keystone Distribs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 808
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying New York law).
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implied duty of good faith and fair dealing even if it is not in
breach of its express contractual obligations."39
Highly instructive is a very recent federal case applying
New York law in which a distributor of luxury cars asserted
that the manufacturer of Lamborghini vehicles had wrongfully
stripped it of exclusivity and arbitrarily refused to approve its
application for a second dealership. 40 The dealership agree-
ment said nothing about either subject, and contained a merger
clause as one would expect. 41 The court concluded that a combi-
nation of the merger clause and the statute of frauds barred
claims for "breach of express contract" and dismissed them.42
However, the court permitted plaintiffs grievance to go forward
as a separately pled "cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."43 In so doing, the court
held sufficient the complaint's allegations of bases for the rea-
sonable expectations said to be violated, in part relying on oral
representations otherwise unactionable because of the statute
of frauds.44
An even more recent trial court discussion of why a cause of
action can be based directly on an implied covenant, even ab-
sent violation of express provision, is very emphatic on that
point:
Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants breached a specific
provision of their provider agreements, but that they breached
their duty of good faith and fair dealing by (1) belatedly seeking
payment refunds on claims that were previously authorized
orally, of which they had notice, and which they had months or
years to investigate; (2) withholding payments on false pretenses
(with respect to Empire and Horizon); (3) withholding payments
on unrelated claims; and (4) doing all of these things in consulta-
tion and coordination with each other. In my May 18 Order, I
concluded that the complaint properly stated a cause of action for
39. Id. at 815.
40. See Manhattan Motorcars, Inc. v. Automobili Lamborghini, S.p.A., No. 07
Civ. 978, 2007 WL 1988144, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2007).
41. Id. at *2.
42. Id. at *7.
43. Id. at *8.
44. Id.
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breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and I
now affirm that opinion.45
The New York Court of Appeals has spoken as well. In a
2002 case, the sponsor of a cooperative conversion was alleged
to have stymied shareholder expectations by failing to dispose
of its unsold shares within a reasonable time.46 The trial court
had dismissed the cause of action because the offering plan was
silent on this subject. 47 In response to a certification from the
appellate division, the court of appeals, for those lower courts
which were listening, had this to say:
While the duties of good faith and fair dealing do not imply obliga-
tions "inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relation-
ship," they do encompass "any promises which a reasonable
person in the position of the promisee would be justified in under-
standing were included."48
In still additional cases, even express reservations of discretion
do not thwart implied at law requirements of fairness. 49 A
watch manufacturer's express reservation of discretion on fill-
ing orders does not prohibit a cause of action based on bad faith
delays in doing so. 50 A securities broker's power to liquidate
customer holdings, stated to be at its full discretion, must none-
theless be exercised in good faith.51 Indeed, in a very revealing
case, a franchisee had alleged that franchisor's actions, while
left to franchisor's discretion by agreement, were nonetheless
wrongful. 52 The Second Circuit held it to be reversible error not
to give an independent charge on the implied duty of good faith
in addition to an express contract charge:
DMG claims that Carvel, in its dealings with DMG, unjustifi-
ably frustrated DMG's efforts to perform under the distributor-
45. Gross v. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc., No. 602848-2005, 2007 WL
2066390, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 18, 2007).
46. 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 773 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y.
2002).
47. Id. at 498.
48. Id. at 500-01 (citations omitted).
49. E.g., Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
50. Maddaloni Jewelers, Inc. v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 838 N.Y.S.2d 536
(App. Div. 2007).
51. Modem Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 936 F.2d 640, 644
(2d Cir. 1991).
52. Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Mgmt. Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1991).
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ship agreement and thus breached the implied duty of good
faith ....
... While the distributorship agreement gave Carvel consid-
erable discretion with regard to advertising, store location, whole-
sale sales, and other matters, this did not relieve Carvel of its
duty to act in good faith.
Under the circumstances, a simple, direct instruction on the
implied duty of good faith was called for; a "subsumed" good faith
charge was not sufficient.... Without this specific guidance from
the court, the jury was left with no legal context in which to as-
sess the significance of the bad faith evidence offered by DMG.53
Here, the tandem interaction of the express and implied-at-law
creates a tension in which the latter prevails. We have, in ef-
fect, "interpretation as a matter of law."
A Reconciliation
Admittedly, the use of good faith to create obligations as to
which the actual agreement is silent lends an air of unpredict-
ability to the outcome of certain types of disputes. But what is
the alternative? There are obviously countless potential situa-
tions in which rigid adherence to express terms would either
thwart reasonable expectations or else foreclose any sort of
"minimum decencies" analysis. Putting a good faith gloss on ex-
press terms is only a partial solution, and even the willingness
to go that far will create uncertainty in cases of competing equi-
ties. That is the nature of norms which cannot be reduced to
mathematical equation.
There are, of course, wholly legitimate reasons to refuse to
engraft implied at law terms onto an actual agreement, but a
conclusion that such implication is improper whenever it would
create "new" duties rather than to regulate performance of ac-
tual undertakings is not a good one. The most common reason
to refuse legal implication of additional unspecified undertak-
ings is that the claimant fails to plead facts supporting a mean-
ingful inference of violation of reasonable expectations.
Similarly, the absence of a "gap" to be plugged with unwritten
good faith restrictions may be shown by prevailing party prac-
53. Id. at 230-31.
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tice, or accepted (and acceptable) custom and usage. 54 It might
also be that the requested gap filler would be inconsistent with
public policy, or of a type best suited to legislative or agency
intervention. This would explain those cases refusing to impose
restrictions on at-will employment. 55 Also, in many instances,
one can directly extrapolate from what Cardozo termed actual
intentions "imperfectly expressed," thus to render at law sup-
plementation less paramount or even unnecessary.
Part of the confusion about the proper use of at-law good
faith requirements may be attributable to the fact that different
types of "gap fillers" serve very different functions. Where in-
terpretation permits a conclusion that a party assumed the risk
of a harsh supervening contingency, a court normally ought not
use implication as a matter of law to supply an omitted term
excusing performance. Here, we would have a classic example
of where a court should "interpret, then stop." This would not
be merely because of contractual silence as to what happened,
but because contract law and underlying policy recognize that
contracting parties should usually be free to allocate these types
of risk.5 6
On the other hand, the law has increasingly seen to it that
certain types of contracts are to be governed by various subspe-
cies of good faith type gap-fillers (affirmative efforts, coopera-
tion and non-prevention) designed to do more than regulate how
actual terms of agreement are performed. This is increasingly
true of long-term relational contracts, even those not deemed
fiduciary. It is here, in fact, that courts are most apt to construe
as a matter of law to deal with evolving circumstances. So too,
when it comes to the use of standardized agreements, the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts goes so far as to require that
meaning be determined based on prototypical "reasonable ex-
pectations," irrespective of what the contract actually says, or
even whether the party provided with the form has actually
54. E.g., E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
("fuel freighting" by airline is not a violation of its obligation to set its fuel require-
ments in commercial good faith).
55. E.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
56. Even this approach has potential "minimum decencies" limitations. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (2003) (dealing with impracticability). "[Tihis section
itself sets up the commercial standard for normal and reasonable interpretation
and provides a minimum beyond which agreement may not go." Id.
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read it. 57 Legislatures and administrative agencies increasingly
dictate contractual content, or else ban certain types of provi-
sions. Whatever one's views on the matter, particularly where
it comes to the non-arm's length, contractual construction has
taken on a highly mandatory flavor steeped in legislated
content.
In Wood v. Lucy, Cardozo was early to realize that gap-fill-
ers do far more than to shape performance of express terms.
Contractual silence, even in cases of the eminently foreseeable,
did not preclude legal implication of good faith requirements.
Such implication should only be thwarted if the overall transac-
tional dynamic, under a holistic assumption of risk or some
other "reasonable expectations" analysis, so dictate. It took
quite some time for other courts to accept this approach, and
there are still surprising pockets of resistance to this day.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2)(3) (1981).
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